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THE FEDERAL AND NINTH CIRCUITS SQUARE
OFF: REFUSALS TO DEAL AND THE PRECARIOUS
INTERSECTION BETWEEN ANTITRUST AND
PATENT LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Although both the patent and antitrust laws were designed to stimulate the
economy and benefit consumers, a fundamental tension between the two has
always existed.' The primary goal of the antitrust laws is to preserve efficient
economic competition by discouraging anticompetitive monopolistic behavior
and unreasonable restraints on trade or commerce.2 In contrast, the patent
laws seek to encourage innovation, research, and development by rewarding
the patentee with a monopoly in the protected works for a statutorily
prescribed time.3 It is possible for one to imagine a legal landscape where
both schemes work in harmony to promote the public good; however, in
practice the schemes often overlap in precarious ways. An excellent example
of this friction is illustrated by the recent split in the circuit courts concerning
the rights of a patent holder to unilaterally refuse to deal.
In February 2000, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its
controversial opinion in In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust
Litigation ("ISO"). 4 Essentially, the ISO court found that it is entirely proper
for a patent holder to leverage its congressionally sanctioned monopoly power
in one market by refusing to deal with competitors in a second relevant
market, regardless of whether a valid business justification exists.5 The ISO
court made it clear that although such a refusal might carry with it an
anticompetitive effect, only a showing of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent
Office, or sham litigation would preclude such behavior.6 This holding not
1. See E. Thomas Sullivan, The Confluence of Antitrust and Intellectual Property at the New
Century, 1 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2000); Carl W. Schwartz, The Intellectual
Property/Antitrust Interface, 7 No. 6 ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP. 15 (2000); Sharon
Brawner McCullen, Comment, The Federal Circuit and Ninth Circuit Face-Off" Does A Patent
Holder Violate The Sherman Act By Unilaterally Excluding Others From A Patented Invention In
More Than One Relevant Market?, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 469 (2001).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2002).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2002); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A
Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1817 (1984).
4. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001).
5. See id. at 1327-28.
6. Id.; see also infra Part II.
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only flies in the face of traditional notions of antitrust and patent law 7 but also
it directly conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's 1997 decision in Image Technical
Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, Co. ("Kodak").8 On nearly identical facts,
the Kodak court adopted a rebuttable presumption of a patent holder's valid
business justification in a monopoly leveraging claim.9 The court held that
the presumption of validity could be overcome by evidence that the patent
was unlawfully acquired or that the proffered business justification was
merely a "pretext," advanced only to "mask anticompetitive conduct."' 0
Although some commentators have attempted to harmonize the two opinions
by drawing intricate distinctions,'' it is clear that the Federal Circuit decision
disregards important antitrust and patent law.
The Federal Circuit's decision disregards both the realities of the
marketplace and the letter of antitrust law. A decision like ISO benefits patent
holders at the expense of competitors, especially smaller competitors such as
the independent service organization members involved in that litigation.
2
Precedent suggests that a patent holder has the right to be free of scrutiny
when unilaterally refusing to deal with competitors in the primary market for
a patented product. 3  However, when that legitimate right is abused by
extending the refusal to a separate and distinct market for unjustifiable
anticompetitive reasons, the patent holder has stepped outside the law. 14
The remainder of this Comment will analyze the background of both
patent and antitrust law, point out the current conflict, and suggest the
direction the law should take in the future. Specifically, Part II gives an
overview of the two statutory schemes and their interpretations, as well as
outlines the creation of, and congressionally intended jurisdiction of, the
7. See infra Parts II and I11.
8. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998).
9. See id.
10. Id. at 1219.
11. See, e.g., Michelle M. Burtis & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Why an Original Can be Better Than
a Copy: Intellectual Propery, The Antitrust Refusal to Deal, andISO Antitrust Litigation, 9 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 143, 145 (2001) (distinguishing the two opinions based on the presence of patents for all
parts sold in secondary markets or the lack thereof).
12. See Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust and the Systemic Bias Against Small Business: Kodak,
Strategic Conduct, and Leverage Theory, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 231 (2001); see also Douglas L.
Rogers, Give the Smaller Players a Chance: Shaping the Digital Economy through Antitrust and
Copyright Law, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 13 (2001).
13. Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1216. "Kodak and its amicus correctly indicate that the right of
exclusive dealing is reserved from antitrust liability. We find no reported case in which a court has
imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent or copyright." Id.
14. Id. at 1216-17. "This basic right of exclusion does have its limits .... Section 2 of the
Sherman Act condemns exclusionary conduct that extends natural monopolies into separate markets.
Much depends, therefore, on the definition of the patent grant and the relevant market." Id. at 1216.
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Federal Circuit. Part III discusses, in detail, the Federal Circuit's and Ninth
Circuit's decisions in ISO and Kodak, respectively, with a focus on the
differences in the courts' reasoning and support, or lack thereof, offered in the
decisions. In addition, Part IV.A outlines changes to the jurisdictional reach
of the Federal Circuit and discusses the impact those changes may have on
both antitrust and patent law. Part IV.B considers the flaws in the Federal
Circuit's analysis in ISO and the deleterious effects the court's rationale is
likely to have. Finally, Part IV.C offers some possible solutions that would
reconcile patent and antitrust law in this area, such as action by Congress or a
Supreme Court opinion definitively affirming Kodak.
II. BACKGROUND AND EXISTING LAW
Whether a patent holder has violated the antitrust laws will turn on the
interpretation of both patent law and the Sherman Act. 15 The patent laws
provide qualified holders with immunity from liability for refusing to license
or sell patented products or ideas. 16 However, the Sherman Act makes the use
of natural or legal monopoly power in one market to leverage power in the
next market illegal.' 7 Harmonization of these two bodies of law has yet to be
achieved either by statute or by Supreme Court decision, as illustrated by the
current split in the circuits.' 8 Therefore, consideration of the underlying
principles involved is essential to understanding the issues at the heart of the
courts' decisions in ISO and Kodak. The remainder of this section seeks to
clarify the conflicting views involved. Part II.A considers the Sherman Act,
refusal to deal, and analogous antitrust law principles helpful in the analysis
of the relevant case law. Part II.B then describes the elements of a valid
patent and the extent to which Congress intended the Act to shield patent
holders from liability. Finally, Part II.C considers the role of the Federal
Circuit in the realm of antitrust litigation, considering Congress's intent in
creating the court as a backdrop.
A. The Sherman Act and Monopoly Leveraging
In 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman Act making, under section 1 of
the Act, "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce" illegal.' 9 Also, section 2 of the Act makes illegal any attempt
15. Id. at 1217-18.
16. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
17. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992) (citing
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)).
18. Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1217.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2002). The current version of section 1 reads in full as follows:
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to monopolize.2° While the implications of this legislation have provided the
basis for over a century of litigation, it is generally understood that Congress
intended the Act to benefit consumers by promoting healthy economic
21
competition.
Although, by definition, a violation of section 1 of the Act must generally
involve more than one party, courts have found that certain situations, such as
the tying of one good to another by a monopolist, will give rise to a
violation.22 Success in a tying case requires evidence that the supplier has
conditioned the sale of one desirable product, in which it holds substantial
market power, upon the unwilling purchase of another.23 In such a case, much
of the court's attention will be focused on determining whether the producer
wields the requisite market power in the tying product, as was the case in the
Supreme Court's decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation,
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id
20. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2002). Section 2 reads:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation,
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
21. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 6.
22. See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
Tying arrangements ... flout the Sherman Act's policy that competition rule the marts of
trade. Basic to the faith that a free economy best promotes the public weal is that goods
must stand the cold test of competition; that the public acting through the market's
impersonal judgment, shall allocate the Nation's resources and thus direct the course its
economic development will take .... By conditioning his sale of one commodity on the
purchase of another, a seller coerces the abdication of buyers' independent judgment as to
the "tied" product's merits and insulates it from the competitive stresses of the open
market.
Id. at 605.
23. See id; see also Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1180 (1st
Cir. 1994) (refusing to turn the question of a tie-in over to the jury because of insufficient evidence
that the two products in question were actually two distinct products, namely service and support).
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Inc. 24 In that case, the Court noted that simply because market power in the
tying product is gained by some natural advantage such as a patent, the patent
holder is not immune from antitrust liability when that power is extended into
a secondary market.25 Indeed, courts have consistently held that such
behavior by a patent holder may, and in some cases will, give rise to
liability.
2 6
A claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act carries with it no requirement
of combination. A monopolization claim under section 2 must allege two
basic elements: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident. 27
Monopoly power has been described as the power to exclude competition
or control prices and may be inferred from market share.28 However, the mere
24. 504 U.S. 451, 477 (1992) (finding Kodak had not carried its burden on summary judgment
of lack of sufficient market power in primary parts market).
25. Id. at 488 n.29. "The Court has held many times that power gained through some natural
and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if 'a
seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next."' Id. (quoting
Times-Picayune Pub. Co., 345 U.S. at 511) (citing Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947); Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v.
United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922)).
26. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1944). The Court
noted:
It is the protection of the public ... [that] denies to the patentee after issuance the power to
use it in such a way as to acquire a monopoly which is not plainly within the terms of the
grant. The necessities or convenience of the patentee do not justify any use of the
monopoly of the patent to create another monopoly. The fact that the patentee has the
power to refuse a license does not enable him to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by the
expedient of attaching conditions to its use.
Id
27. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). Section 2 of the Sherman Act
also allows for damages from attempted monopolization. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2002). The elements of
an attempt claim under section 2 are similar but not identical. The Kodak court described them as
follows: "(1) a specific intent to control prices or destroy competition; (2) predatory or
anticompetitive conduct directed at accomplishing that purpose; (3) a dangerous probability of
achieving 'monopoly power,' and (4) causal antitrust injury." Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield, Co.,
51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)). Although it may be easier in theory to prevail under an attempt
claim, the elements are almost identical and require the same type of proof. Therefore, often both
types of section 2 claims will be advanced. See, e.g., Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1202. In Kodak, Kodak
primarily challenged the section 2 monopoly claim although it had a verdict against it for both
because, as the Ninth Circuit pointed out, a successful reversal of the section 2 monopoly claim
would have also upset the section 2 attempt claim. See id. For the purpose of this Comment, only
section 2 monopolization claims will be considered.
28. See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (citing United States v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351
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possession of such power without a showing of anticompetitive conduct is
harmless.29
To be successful on a section 2 claim, the plaintiff must show either actual
or circumstantial evidence of the defendant's monopoly power in the relevant
market. 30 Because of the inherent difficulty of showing actual market power,
most cases will involve only circumstantial evidence. 3' The court must first
determine the character of the relevant market. 32 In doing so, courts will take
into account both economic and geographic criteria.33
After the court has determined the relevant market, the complaining party
must then show that the defendant maintains a dominant share in that
market.34 Although there is no requisite level of market consolidation that
will be considered a dominant share,35 over eighty percent control of a
relevant market will generally be a sufficient showing. 36 Many courts have
found that a much lower percentage will constitute a dominant share of the
market.37
The final factor in proving monopoly power requires a showing of
11 38
"significant barriers to entry," such as patents or essential facilities.Although patents are a good indication of monopoly power, the possession of
U.S. 377, 391 (1956)).
29. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 1999). "Intel does
not dispute the high market share achieved by its high performance microprocessors. However, that
is not a violation of law." Id. at 1354.
30. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995).
31. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571. "In United States v. E.l. du Pont De Nemours & Co ... we
defined monopoly power as 'the power to control prices or exclude competition.' The existence of
such power ordinarily may be inferred from the predominant share of the market." Id. (internal
citation omitted).
32. Id. at 571-72.
33. See id. (finding that different types of security services were not substitutes and that
geographic market for such security services was national in scope).
34. See id. at 570-71.
35. See Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 489 (5th Cir. 1984).
36. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946).
37. See, e.g., Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 980 F.2d 171, 201-03 (3d Cir. 1992)
(finding 55% of resilient floor covering market to be dominant enough to confer monopoly power
when combined with other factors).
38. Rebel Oil Co. v. At. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit
stated that:
[M]ere showing of substantial or even dominant market share alone cannot establish
market power sufficient to carry out a predatory scheme. The plaintiff must show that new
rivals are barred from entering the market and show that existing competitors lack the
capacity to expand their output to challenge the predator's high price.
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a patent will not, in and of itself, "demonstrate [monopoly] power., 39
However, the Supreme Court has held that lack of sufficient market power in
a primary market will not, as a matter of law, preclude a finding of sufficient
monopoly power in a derivative market.40
Once the plaintiff has shown monopoly power in the market concerned to
the satisfaction of the court, he or she must then provide evidence showing
that the defendant used the power "to foreclose competition, to gain a
competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor. ' 4  In a "monopoly
leveraging" case, the emphasis will be placed on the defendant's conduct in
the secondary market.42 Often the alleged anticompetitive behavior in such a
case will be a unilateral refusal to deal with competitors in the secondary
market with the intent to eliminate competition.43 To determine whether this
conduct is anticompetitive, the court will look to the economic realities of the
44situation, including the effects on both competitors and consumers.
If legitimate anticompetitive effect in the secondary market can be shown,
it will then be incumbent upon the defendant to provide a legitimate business
justification.45 An important and relevant example of such a justification is
the desire to profit from rightfully obtained intellectual property rights.46
However, the Kodak decision stands for the proposition that such a
justification may be rebutted with evidence suggesting that it is pretextual.47
In non-patent cases, other justifications have included contentions that
economic efficiency mandated a refusal to deal.48 In reaction to such
arguments, the Supreme Court has held that a substantial change in business
practice may legitimately contribute to a jury finding that a proffered business
justification was invalid or pretextual.49
39. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing
Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
40. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992); see also infra this
Part.
41. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. at 482-83 (citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107
(1948)).
42. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 1997).
43. See, e.g., In re Indep. Serv. Org., 203 F.3d at 1326-27.
44. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985). "The
question whether Ski Co.'s conduct may properly be characterized as exclusionary cannot be
answered by simply considering its effect on Highlands. In addition, it is relevant to consider its
impact on consumers and whether it has impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way."
Id.
45. See id. at 608.
46. Kodak, 125 F.3dat 1219.
47. Id. at 1219-20.
48. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 608-1I.
49. Id. This is important when considering the decisions in ISO and Kodak. Both cases
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The Sherman Act is an important and useful tool for the small and
defenseless competitor who has been shoved out of business by
anticompetitive behavior.50 Although a monopoly may be sanctioned in one
market, it defies the letter and spirit of the Sherman Act to use that power as a
lever to gain a stranglehold on a second market. As the next section shall
illustrate, patent holders rightfully enjoy the monopoly position granted to
them by Congress, but when they overstep the limitations of this grant, they
have violated the Sherman Act and should be held accountable.
B. The Patent Act, Defenses, and Counter Claims
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the
right "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries. '51 Pursuant to this grant, the second session of the
First Congress passed the original incarnation of the modem United States
Patent Act.52 The Act has evolved over the years into an intricate web of case
53law and legislation; however, the spirit of the original Act remains.
The basic requirements for patent protection are enumerated in Title 35 of
the United States Code. Section 101 of that Title states: "Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
involved situations in which the ISOs involved had been doing business with Kodak and Xerox for
substantial periods of time. See Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1201. Then, almost without warning, they were
suddenly unable to obtain certain parts necessary for them to remain in business. See id. Part of the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Kodak dealt with the fact that:
[a] company with monopoly power in a relevant market has no general duty to cooperate
with its business rivals and may refuse to deal with them or with their customers if valid
business reasons exist for such refusal. It is unlawful, however, for a monopolist to engage
in conduct, including refusals to deal, that unnecessarily excludes or handicaps
competitors in order to maintain a monopoly.
Id. at 1209 (alteration in original). Also, as the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Kodak, the Supreme
Court has held that past dealings may be used as evidence of monopolistic behavior in a refusal to
deal case. See id. at 1210-11. Therefore, under the Supreme Court's decision in Aspen Skiing, a
business justification may be rebutted by evidence that there has been a "conscious choice to change
an established pattern of distribution to the detriment of competitors." Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1211.
50. See Grimes, supra note 12, at 236-39 (stating current antitrust case law disadvantages small
firms through its intolerance of collective action by smaller competitors and its curtailment of causes
of action that may provide relief to victimized small businesses).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52. See Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S. 519, 524 (1966) (describing the historical roots of patent
law from English common law to the present).
53. See id at 524-25.
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therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 54  The
courts have broadly construed the "new and useful" requirement, 55 but the
laws of nature and other abstract ideas have been held unpatentable. 56  In
addition, the subject matter of the patent must be described in writing57 and
meet the additional statutory requirements of novelty and non-obviousness.5 8
Once a party has convinced the Patent Office that it has cleared the
threshold requirements for receiving a patent or copyright, 59 the party is
entitled to all the rights and privileges conferred in Title 35. Among these
benefits is the right to exclude others from the use or sale of the protected
process or product for a period of twenty years.60  Also, in defense of a
lawfully obtained patent, the holder is granted the right to bring suit under the
Act for infringement. A successful proceeding for patent infringement will
entitle the patent holder to relief in the form of an injunction,62 damages,63 or
both.64
In defense of an infringement action, defendants should, and have
traditionally been entitled to, offer a number of counterclaims. These have
traditionally been broken down into five categories: (1) Walker Process
claims; (2) "sham" litigation claims; (3) patent pooling claims; (4) repetitive
litigation claims; and (5) tying and other claims. 65
A Walker Process claim requires proving that the patent owner obtained
the patent by willfully or knowingly fraudulent means and then attempted to
foreclose competition, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, by
seeking to enforce the invalid patent by means of litigation.66 So called
54. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002). The blanket requirements of the statute have been the subject of
much litigation. For example, in Brenner v. Mason the Supreme Court explained that an invention is
useful if it exhibits "specific benefit." Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35.
55. See McCullen, supra note 1, at 473-74.
56. See id. at 474.
57. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2002) (requiring the invention be described in writing as well as the
process used in making the invention and the use for which it is intended).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002) (novelty); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2002) (non-obviousness).
59. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
60. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2002).
61. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2002).
62. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2002).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2002).
64. See McCullen, supra note 1, at 475-76.
65. See, e.g., Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act
and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REv.
175, 204-16 (1989); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 2-3.
66. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 3-4. There are three elements to a Walker Process claim: (1)
the patent was obtained through willful fraud; (2) the patent owner attempted to or did enforce the
fraudulently obtained patent; and (3) the defendant has standing to pursue the counterclaim.
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"sham" litigation claims are very similar to Walker Process claims; however,
the claimant must only prove that the patentee knew the patent was invalid
when enforcement was attempted.67 In contrast, patent pooling claims involve
valid patents, but allege that the patents were "pooled" with other patentees in
the same industry to create, or attempt to create, a monopoly in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act.68  Other frequently used counterclaims to an
infringement suit are illegal tying, licensing, and/or price fixing.69 This is
where a monopoly leveraging counterclaim under section 2 would fall, and
such counterclaims will be discussed throughout this Comment.
In the past, the courts' receptiveness to the antitrust counterclaims
70
mentioned above and the patent misuse doctrine have represented the most
potent and effective countermeasures to a patent infringement claim.71 In
general, a patent misuse defense will involve allegations that the patent holder
has illegally extended his congressionally sanctioned monopoly in violation of
both the Patent Act and the antitrust laws. For example, in Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Investment Co.72  and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co.,73 Mercoid was found to have impermissibly tied
the sale of a license for its patented product to the purchase of non-patented
switches in violation of antitrust law.74 The Supreme Court held that a patent
misuse defense could serve as a per se violation of the antitrust laws, but
noted that the plaintiff's prayer for injunctive relief and treble damages
technically formed a separate statutory cause of action. 75 Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, held that "[t]he legality of any attempt to bring
67. Calkins, supra note 65, at 210-13. These claims are also known as Handguard claims,
referring to a case of the same name. The basic element here is that the patentee was acting in bad
faith by attempting to enforce the invalid patent. In addition to actual litigation, threats of litigation
have recently become subject to "sham" litigation claims.
68. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 170-77 (193 1); see also Kobe Inc. v.
Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952) (holding that when a holding company that
obtained patents for seventy-two types of hydraulic pumps had intent to control the entire industry,
the infringement suit against a potential competitor was merely a thinly veiled attempt to maintain or
expand the unlawful monopoly). But see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (2d
Cir. 1981) (holding that there would be no basis for a counterclaim under the Sherman Act when a
patent had been lawfully obtained). See also Calkins, supra note 65, at 208-11 (discussing same).
69. See Calkins, supra note 65, at 213-14.
70. See, e.g., Robert J. Hoerner, The Decline (and Fall?) of the Patent Misuse Doctrine in the
Federal Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (2002) (describing both misuse and antitrust counterclaims
and the disdain thereof in the Federal Circuit).
71. See Calkins, supra note 65, at 175-92.
72. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
73. 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
74. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 664-67 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944).
75. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. at 683-84.
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unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is measured by the anti-
trust laws not by the patent law.",76 Therefore, the Court sanctioned a misuse
defense to patent infringement suits based on alleged antitrust violations by
the plaintiff.7 7  The main difference between this sort of defense and a
counterclaim alleging antitrust violations is the need for the defendant to
prove anticompetitive effect in a counterclaim situation.78
The availability of the misuse defense has been significantly curtailed in
recent years because of a number of questionable lower court decisions and a
recent change to the Patent Act. First, the Federal Circuit has taken steps to
limit and possibly eradicate the defense, an issue that will be discussed in the
next section. 79 Also, a significant change was recently made to the patent law
scheme by the congressional amendment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), entitled the
1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act.80 This change added language to the section
mandating that:
No patent holder shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one
or more of the following ... (4) refus[ing] to license or use any rights
to the patent; or (5) condition[ing] the license of any rights to the
patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a
license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product,
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market
power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on
which the license or sale is conditioned. '
In ISO, the Federal Circuit used this language to bolster its contention that
a patent holder has an unqualified right to refuse to deal, and it has also used
the language to disregard the patent misuse defense. However, there has
been wide disagreement over the intention and application of this section."
While the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act was being contemplated, there
was disagreement as to the scope of the reform. This controversy did not end
76. See id. at 684.
77. See Calkins, supra note 65, at 186.
78. See id. at 186-87.
79. See infra Part II.C.
80. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2002); Patent Misuse Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-703 § 201, 102
Stat. 4674, 4676 (1988); H.R. 4972, 100th Cong. (1988).
81. Id.
82. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
83. See infra Part IV; see also Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195,
1216 n.8 (9th Cir. 1997) (disregarding any application of the statutory section in question to a claim
of monopoly leveraging by a patent holder).
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with passage of the Act.84 During Senate Hearings on the subject, Senator De
Concini stated that the bill dealt "'only with a small piece of the patent misuse
problem-tying arrangements-and leaves the rest for [Congress] to address in
the future."'' 85 Although earlier versions of the bill essentially would have
wiped out the patent misuse defense, this statement is evidence of a
congressional compromise intended to simply move the defense from the per
se category used in the Mercoid cases to a rule of reason analysis by the
courts. 86 In addition, this statement acknowledges the fact that the legislature
understood it was dealing with very specific issues, i.e., tying arrangements
and cases involving a patent misuse defense. There is no evidence in either
the House or Senate debates, or the amendment itself, indicating that the final
version of the bill was meant to be applied outside the bounds of such
instances, or to be used to completely disregard the patent misuse defense.87
The public policy behind the Patent Act is sound; however, at the
intersection with antitrust law, considerable tension exists. Recent changes to
the legislative landscape have arguably increased this tension and
undoubtedly added to the confusion surrounding the key issues for courts and
the business community alike. The remainder of this section will seek to
further illustrate these tensions while considering the role that the Federal
Circuit has, and indeed will continue, to play in both antitrust and patent law.
C. The Role of the Federal Circuit Leading Up to the ISO Litigation
Perhaps the most important and influential changes to antitrust law in the
United States came from the creation of a court whose jurisdiction was
intended only to refine, bring uniformity to, and competently decide appellate
cases arising under the Patent Act. The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit was created by Congress with the passage of The Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982.88 Congress was concerned with what it perceived
as inconsistency in appellate decisions, anchored by essentially the same
issues in the area of the patent law. 89 With this in mind, Congress sought to
84. Calkins, supra note 65, at 192-200. The original version of House Bill 438, which later
became the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act, was much broader in scope and would have required
defendants claiming misuse to provide proof of a substantive violation of the antitrust laws in order
to be successful. Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 100-492 (1988).
85. Calkins, supra note 65, at 198 (citing 134 Cong. Rec. S17, 147 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988)).
86. Id. at 197. "As to [the amended § 271(d)(4)], Congress chose to codify existing case law.
Because little controversy exists over the right of a patent owner to refuse to use a patent or to license
to others, the codification adds little to existing law." Id.
87. See S. Rep. No. 100-492 (1988).
88. Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
89. Scott A. Stempel & John F. Terzaken, Casting a Long IP Shadow Over Antitrust
Jurisprudence: The Federal Circuit's Expanding Jurisdictional Reach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 713
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form a court that would evenly and fairly administer the patent laws.
90
Congress created the Federal Circuit and granted the court exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases with claims "arising under" patent law.91
Even before its creation, critics of the formation of the Federal Circuit
feared that, although created to deal almost exclusively with patent law, the
court's jurisdiction would grow to encompass other important areas of law
whose place was properly in front of regional circuit courts of appeals. 92 In
addition, many feared that plaintiffs and defendants alike would be, in effect,
allowed to undertake the much feared practice of forum shopping to gain
access to the presumably favorable Federal Circuit. This, it was feared, could
be done by simply interjecting a patent or copyright claim into a case that had
its gravaman rooted securely in another area of law such as antitrust.93 It
seems, however, that legislators were placated by pro-Federal Circuit groups
urging that the court would exercise proper discretion when dealing with both
parties and jurisdictional issues. 94  Not very long after the creation of the
court, the critics' fears were fully realized.
For a period of about six years following the passage of the Act creating
the Federal Circuit, some confusion remained as to exactly how far the
jurisdiction of the court would be extended. In 1988, the Supreme Court lent
its voice to the debate with its decision in Christianson v. Colt Industries
Operating Corp.95 In that case, the plaintiff sued in federal court and
advanced antitrust and tort claims revolving around alleged retaliation on the
part of the defendant for the plaintiffs alleged misuse of his former
96employer's trade secrets. After a district court ruling in favor of the plaintiff
for antitrust violations and tortious interference, the defendant appealed to the
Federal Circuit, which overturned the lower court's decision.97 The Supreme
Court relied on the traditional "well-pleaded complaint rule" in overturning
(2002) (citing S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 20 (1981)).
90. See Ronald S. Katz & Adam J. Safer, Should One Patent Court be Making Antitrust Law
for the Whole Country?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 687-88 (2002).
91. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a), 1338(a) (2002).
92. Stempel & Terzaken, supra note 89, at 713.
93. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 20-21 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11).
94. Id. "Notwithstanding these concerns, the Senate Report reflects a confidence that the
Federal Circuit, like the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals that it
replaced, would use its discretion in assuring that claims were properly before it and that it would
apply the correct law." Id.
95. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
96. Id. However, the plaintiff also alleged that a number of Colt's patents were in fact invalid,
a point which the district court agreed with in invalidating nine of Colt's patents before being
overturned by the Federal Circuit, which was then overturned by the Supreme Court.
97. Id.
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the Federal Circuit for lack of jurisdiction.98 The Court held that Federal
Circuit jurisdiction will be appropriate only in:
those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that
federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal patent law, in that Tatent law is a necessary
element of one of the well-pleaded claims.9
The Court concluded that Federal Circuit jurisdiction was not appropriate
even though the arguments of both parties involved patent law, as the success
of those claims was not rooted in the interpretation of patent law.' 
00
Despite what would seem to be clear and decisive instruction from the
Supreme Court in Christianson on the issue of jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit
nevertheless found it appropriate to unilaterally expand its jurisdiction shortly
thereafter. In Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-
Buehrle, Ltd., 10' a case in which the facts were surprisingly similar to those in
Christianson, the Federal Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) jurisdiction
was appropriate in cases in which the cause of action was not created by the
patent laws. 102 According to the court, the primary distinguishing factor
between the two cases was the presence of a counterclaim for patent
infringement. 0 3 Essentially, the court found that counterclaims and claims
have the same meaning within the parameters of Title 28; therefore,
Christianson was not implicated and jurisdiction was proper.' 04 In support of
its decision the court noted, "Congress did not mention the 'well pleaded
complaint rule' as such and no warrant exists for reading that judicially
created device into the statute when doing so would defeat the congressional
purpose [of uniformity in patent law]."' 1 5 Although the Federal Circuit noted
that a contrary decision could encourage forum shopping, 0 6 the court's
holding in this case and others seemed to do just that by allowing a defendant
to direct an appeal to a potentially sympathetic forum with a well-pleaded
98. Id. at 808-09.
99. Id. at 809.
100. Id. at 810.
101. 895 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
102. See id.
103. Id. at 738, 745.
104. Id. at 741-44.
105. Id. at 744.
106. Id. at 744-45.
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infringement counterclaim.1
0 7
In addition to expanding its jurisdiction, prior to the ISO decision the
Federal Circuit also undertook a course of jurisprudence which has
continuously and increasingly deteriorated the rights of parties seeking relief
from antitrust injuries.' 8 One example is the Federal Circuit's decisions
curtailing and, as some commentators have suggested, altogether abolishing
the patent misuse defense mentioned above. 0 9 Using the amendment to 28
U.S.C. § 271(d) as ammunition, a line of cases suggests that the Federal
Circuit will be unwilling in the future to find any type of antitrust misuse
defense sufficient to overcome a patent infringement claim."0 In C.R. Bard,
Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc.,' the court refused to acknowledge the patent misuse
defense despite a jury verdict and the court's acknowledgement that the
plaintiffs actions essentially constituted an antitrust violation." 2 Decisions
such as these not only detract from the credibility of Federal Circuit
jurisprudence but also they place parties harmed by the anticompetitive
conduct of patentees in an extremely precarious position.
Also, the Federal Circuit has been extremely unwilling to find for, or even
seriously entertain, a defendant exerting an antitrust counterclaim." 3  As
discussed above, traditionally there has been a wide range of counterclaims
available to defendants accused of patent infringement under the antitrust
107. See Katz & Safer, supra note 90, at 694 (suggesting same). There is also case law
suggesting that even when a federal district court has bifurcated proceedings in front of it, i.e., patent
claims separated from other claims, the Federal Circuit would have jurisdiction over the case
regardless of whether patent issues were raised in the appeal. See Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.,
747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
108. See supra Part Ii.B.; see also Hoerner, supra note 70, at 685.
The difficulty with [the Federal Circuit's interpretations of precedent] is that in our system
of justice appellate courts are "inferior" to the U.S. Supreme Court, the decisions of which
control and must be followed. If the Supreme Court holds that the sale of a patented article
exhausts the patent monopoly and that monopoly cannot be enlarged by attaching
conditions to its use, or that an "anticompetitive effect" is not required for a finding of
extension of the monopoly-type patent misuse, by what warrant does the Federal Circuit
ignore such holdings? Former Chief Judge Markey had it right when he said: "We are
bound however to adhere to existing Supreme Court guidance in the area until otherwise
directed by Congress or by the Supreme Court.". . . Perhaps the Federal Circuit should
revisit that language.
Id. at 685 (footnote omitted).
109. See, e.g., id. at 683-85.
110. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See generally David R. Steinman & Danielle S. Fitzpatrick, Antitrust Counterclaims in
Patent Infringement Cases: A Guide to Walker Process and Sham-Litigation Claims, 10 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95 (2001).
MARQUETTE LA W&EVIEW
laws. 114 However, the Federal Circuit has edited the list of possible recovery
scenarios under the antitrust laws to situations involving the following: (1)
fraud on the Patent Office in obtaining the patent; (2) a narrow category of
"sham" litigation claims; and (3) the use of a patented product to "tie" an
unpatented product.' 15 Although a comfort to corporations with valid patents,
this move towards conservatism leaves little protection for those accused of
infringement.
In addition to severely curtailing the defenses and counterclaims available
against patent holders, in the late 1990s the Federal Circuit took another
controversial step by breaking from its tradition of deferring to regional
circuits for precedent and concluding that it would decide certain antitrust
claims under its own precedent. 16 For over'sixteen years, the Federal Circuit
had deferred to the various regional circuits for interpretation of substantive,
non-patent issues presented to it. 117 However, in 1998, the Federal Circuit
issued its decision in Nobelpharma, AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.,"18 which
brought an end to deference and marked the beginning of a dangerous move
towards a new body of Federal Circuit antitrust law. In Nobelpharma, the
Federal Circuit saw fit to overrule its own precedent and hold that Federal
Circuit law would not only control issues within the court's exclusive patent
jurisdiction, but would also control issues that would have previously been
decided under regional circuit law. 19 The court reasoned that because it was
often in the position of having to decide whether a patentee should be stripped
of immunity from antitrust laws,' 20 the court should therefore decide the
antitrust issues for itself rather than having to interpret the law of the regional
circuits. 121 The court stated:
114. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
115. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326-28 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see
also Steinman & Fitzpatrick, supra note 113, at 105.
116. See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
117. See Stempel & Terzaken, supra note 89, at 725-31.
118. 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
119. Id. at 1067-68.
120. This would include suits involving patent infringement, where an antitrust claim was
either the underlying claim or the basis of a counterclaim. See id
121. Id.
[An antitrust claim premised on stripping a patentee of its immunity from the antitrust
laws is typically raised as a counterclaim by a defendant in a patent infringement suit ....
Because most cases involving these issues will therefore be appealed to this court, we
conclude that we should decide these issues as a matter of Federal Circuit law, rather than
rely on various regional precedents.
Id. (internal citation omitted). Many would argue that this is precisely why the Federal Circuit
should not be deciding such cases based on its own precedent and lack of experience or expertise.
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We arrive at this conclusion because we are in the best position to
create a uniform body of federal law on this subject and thereby avoid
the "danger of confusion [that] might be enhanced if this court were to
embark on an effort to interpret the laws" of the regional circuits.1
22
Not only is this argument not persuasive, it seems to defy logic. It is
precisely for the sake of predictability and uniformity that the Federal Circuit
should defer to the regional circuits. The regional circuits have had over 100
years of experience in dealing with the intricate substantive issues involved in
antitrust litigation.123 The Federal Circuit has little. In addition, the creation
of yet another body of law on antitrust issues, one carved out anew by an
inexperienced court, could add considerably to "the danger of confusion" the
Federal Circuit professed to be attempting to curtail. The congressional intent
behind the creation of the Federal Circuit was "'to centralize patent appeals'
and create 'doctrinal stability in the field of patent law."",124 In no way does
the court's decision to lend its voice to the substantive law of antitrust
advance these goals.
A number of things need to be kept in mind when setting the stage for the
Kodak and ISO decisions. First, before the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in
Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,' 25 it appeared as
though the Federal Circuit would be able to hear any antitrust case, even if
patent issues were only peripheral to the subject matter action. 26 In addition,
it was feasible for a party to ensure Federal Circuit jurisdiction by simply
interjecting patent issues into a case. 127  To intensify the problem, most
antitrust cases involve manufacturers of tangible or intangible goods and often
involve patent or copyright issues. Therefore, prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Holmes Group, discussed below, any party with a cognizable
patent law claim could ensure that the Federal Circuit would hear an eventual
appeal. In addition, the unavailability of a patent misuse defense and the
Federal Circuit policy of deciding certain antitrust issues under its own
precedent made the landscape that much more bleak for parties seeking to
defend themselves under the antitrust laws. Therefore, the Federal Circuit's
122. Id. at 1068 (quoting Forman v. United States, 767 F.2d 875, 880 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
123. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
124. Katz & Safer, supra note 90, at 687 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-275 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, at 15).
125. 535 U.S. 826 (2002); see infra Part IV.A.
126. See Burtis & Kobayashi, supra note 11, at 143 (suggesting that this is a happy
consequence of the Federal Circuit's ever-expanding jurisdiction).
127. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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decision in ISO was, and remains, an important one, even if its value as
precedent may currently be in question. 18
III. THE KODAK AND ISO DECISIONS
Although the illegality of monopoly leveraging under section 2 of the
Sherman Act is not a novel concept, 29 the application of this theory of
liability to patent holders in a primary market is relatively new. At this point,
the decisions of the Ninth Circuit in Kodak and the Federal Circuit in ISO
virtually represent the universe of decisions in the area. This section will take
a close look at the factual circumstances of each case as well as the courts'
reasoning in each. Part A will look at the Kodak decision and consider the
theory underlying the decision. Part B will consider the ISO case, as well as
the policy considerations that may have led to its disposition.
A. Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 130
In the early 1980s, Eastman Kodak Company found that selling
photocopiers and microfilm equipment had become increasingly
competitive' 31 because the market for such equipment had become
increasingly condensed. 32 In addition, Kodak was fiercely competing with
corporations such as Xerox, IBM, and Canon for the same business.' 33 To add
to these pressures, Kodak was also competing with the Independent Service
Organizations ("ISOs") in the aftermarket for printer parts and service.' 34
As well as being an original equipment manufacturer, Kodak also
performed maintenance and service work on its equipment, with
manufactured parts or parts purchased from independent suppliers. 35
Gradually ISOs sprung up, offering competing service for Kodak copiers with
parts obtained from Kodak, independent original equipment suppliers, and
other clever sources.' 36 However, in the mid-1980s Kodak began restricting
access to parts it sold directly to the ISOs and coerced the independent
suppliers to do the same. 137 Because the availability of replacement parts was
128. See Katz & Safer, supra note 90, at 736-38.
129. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
130. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
131. Id. at 1200.
132. Id. at 1200-01.
133. Id. at 1200.
134. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
135. Kodak, 125 F.3dat 1200.
136. Id. at 1201. Apparently the ISOs also would buy or somehow obtain new or used
machines to dismantle and use for parts in its service business.
137. Id.
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vital to the survival of the ISOs, they quickly became unable to compete with
Kodak for service contracts.' 38 In 1987, the ISOs turned to the courts for
relief in the form of damages and an injunction putting an end to the parts
sales restrictions.139
In their complaint, the plaintiffs, Image Technical Services, Inc., and
seventeen other independent service organizations alleged that Kodak had
violated both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by: (1) tying the sale of
Kodak copiers to service agreements; and (2) refusing to deal with them in the
secondary or derivative market.140 The District Court for the Northern District
of California granted summary judgment for Kodak. 14 1 The ISOs appealed,
and the Ninth Circuit reversed.1 42 Kodak then appealed to the Supreme Court
and, after granting certiorari, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit. 143 The
Court remanded, holding that a lack of market power in the primary market
would not preclude, as a matter of law, the finding of market power and a
Sherman Act violation in the secondary market. 44 However, the court did not
come to a finding on the merits because of a lack of a complete evidentiary
record. 1
45
On remand, the plaintiffs once again claimed that Kodak had a monopoly
in the primary copier and micrographic equipment market, and alleged that it
attempted to illegally extend that monopoly into the secondary market for
parts and service through its unilateral refusal to deal. 46 However, the ISOs
dropped the section 1 tying and conspiracy claims. 47 In front of the district
court for the second time, the case was given to the jury, which found for the





141. See Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C-87-1686-WWS, 1988 WL
156332 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1988).
142. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992).
143. See id.
144. Id. at 485-86.
In the end, of course, Kodak's arguments may prove to be correct. It may be that its parts,
service, and equipment are components of one unified market, or that the equipment
market does discipline the aftermarkets so that all three are priced competitively overall, or
that any anti competitive effects of Kodak's behavior are outweighed by its competitive
effects. But we cannot reach these conclusions as a matter of law on a record this sparse.
Id at 486.
145. Id.
146. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997).
147. Id. at 1201.
148. Id.
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The district court also granted the ISOs an injunction requiring Kodak to sell
parts to the ISOs at reasonable prices for ten years. 149 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit began by determining whether the district court erred in denying
Kodak's motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the existence of the first
component of a section 2 claim, the existence of monopoly power.150  The
court began its analysis by determining the issue on which the case would
turn: whether Kodak possessed the requisite market power in the "relevant
market."1 51 Kodak claimed that the market for each component copier part
was a separate market in and of itself; therefore, patented and non-patented
parts should be considered separately, with only the inability to obtain non-
patented parts contributing to monopoly power in the service market. 52  On
the other hand, the ISOs advanced an "all parts" theory claiming that the
relevant market "consisted of the entirety of necessary Kodak parts for that
field of equipment." 153  The court agreed with the ISOs, finding that the
''commercial realities" of the situation mandated a finding that the relevant
market be broadly construed as that for all parts for Kodak copiers and
micrograph machines respectively.1
54
Next, the court held that a jury reasonably could find that Kodak's market
share in the parts was in excess of fifty percent and, when considered in
conjunction with the other relevant market factors, could constitute monopoly
149. Id.
The injunction required Kodak to sell: (1) all parts for Kodak equipment; (2) all parts
described in Kodak's Parts Lists; (3) all parts of supply items that are field replaceable by
Kodak technicians; (4) all service manuals and price lists; and (5) all tools or devices
"essential to servicing Kodak equipment."
Id. at 1201-02.
150. Id. at 1203.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1203-04.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1202-06.
Consideration of the "commercial realities" in the markets for Kodak parts compels the use
of an "all parts" market theory. The "commercial reality" faced by service providers and
equipment owners is that a service provider must have ready access to all parts to compete
in the service market. As the relevant market for service "from the Kodak equipment
owner's perspective is composed of only those companies that service Kodak machines,"
the relevant market for parts from the equipment owners' and service providers'
perspective is composed of "all parts" that are designed to meet Kodak photocopier and
micrographs equipment specifications. The makers of these parts "if unified by a
monopolist or hypothetical cartel, would have market power in dealing with" ISOs and end
users.
Id. at 1203-04 (internal citations omitted).
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power.155 In doing so, the court found that jury instructions allowing the
aggregation of Kodak's market share with that of the independent original
equipment manufacturers were appropriate. 56 Once this was done, the court
found that it would have been reasonable for the jury to conclude that
Kodak's market share was sixty-five percent or more."'
Finally, the court considered the third factor of monopoly power, namely
whether extensive barriers to entry existed.158  The evidence showed that
Kodak held numerous patents, controlled its supply and the supply of the
independent original equipment manufacturer, and consistently dominated
the service market. The court concluded that these factors were sufficient to
support its conclusion that extensive barriers to entry in the secondary market
existed, which in turn solidified a finding of monopoly power.' 59
Next, the court considered the second element of a section 2 claim: The
use of monopoly power "to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive
advantage, or to destroy a competitor."' 160  Initially, the court considered
whether the jury should have been instructed to find a violation of section 2
only if the defendant had refused plaintiffs access to "essential facilities."'
16
'
Kodak claimed that a refusal to deal under section 2 could only be considered
illegal when the plaintiff has shown that the defendant's refusal to grant
reasonable access to an "essential facility" has "eliminated competition" in the
relevant market. 62 The court refused to follow Kodak down the "essential
facilities" path and, relying instead on the Supreme Court's decisions in Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.163 and Image Technical Services
(the Supreme Court's earlier disposition of the Kodak litigation), found that a
refusal to deal in a downstream or secondary market will only be permissible
when there is a legitimate competitive justification for doing SO. 16 4
155. Id. at 1206 (citing Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1438 n.10). "In Rebel Oil, we held that a 44%
market share demonstrates market power 'if entry barriers are high and competitors are unable to
expand their output in response to supracompetitive pricing."' Id. at 1207.
156. Id. at 1206-07.
157. Id. However, the court indicated that a finding of market share near 50% "would suffice
to support a jury finding of market power for the purposes of ISOs' attempted monopolization
claim." Id. (citing Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1438 n. 10).
158. Id. at 1207.
159. Id. at 1206-07 (stating barriers to entry can properly include legal devices such as patents).
160. Id. at 1208 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83
(1992)).
161. Id. at 1210 (internal quotations omitted).
162. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
163. Id. at 1209-10.
164. See id.; see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600-05
(1985).
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit turned to the question of whether Kodak's
intellectual property rights formed the basis of a legitimate business
justification. 165 The court recognized the various rights and privileges
afforded patent holders and the solid public policy reasons behind such
grants. 166 Specifically, the court recognized the ordinarily unlimited right of a
patent holder to refuse to license a patent or otherwise appropriate the rights
to a discovery. 16 7  However, the court also recognized the fact that the
exclusionary rights of a patent holder are not absolute. 168  The court
acknowledged traditional limits to a patent holder's right to exclude, such as
the unlawful acquisition of the patent 169 or the extension of a patent beyond its
natural limits. 170
The court concluded that when a monopolist unilaterally refuses to license
or sell its patented or copyrighted goods to a competitor, such action will be
presumed a valid business justification absent evidence the patent was
unlawfully acquired or that the proffered justification merely is a pretext.' 71
The court emphasized that "[t]he presumption should act to focus the fact
finder on the primary interest of both intellectual property and antitrust laws:
public interest."' 172 Therefore, under the court's reasoning, if a finder of fact
determines that public policy warrants a finding that the proffered justification
is a pretext, the justification will be disregarded and a section 2 violation will
result.
Turning to the case at bar, the court found that the jury should have been
informed of the existence of a rebuttable presumption in favor of Kodak's
proffered patent justification; however, the omission of such an instruction
was found to be harmless. 173 In essence, the court found that because the jury
found for the plaintiffs despite instructions directing it to consider potential
business justifications, and because Kodak had argued that its patent rights did
justify its action, the jury had dismissed such justifications as pretextual. 174
165. Kodak, 125 F.3dat 1212-20.
166. Id. at 1215-16.
167. Id. at 1216. "We find no reported case in which a court has imposed antitrust liability for a
unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent or copyright." Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186 (1st Cir.
1994)).
171. Id. at 1219. "The presumption may also be rebutted by evidence of pretext. Neither the
aims of intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws justify allowing a monopolist to rely upon a
pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct." Id.
172. Id. at 1218.
173. Id. at 1220.
174. ld.
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B. In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation' 75
The facts the Federal Circuit confronted in ISO were much the same as
those encountered by the Ninth Circuit in the Kodak litigation. But, the
Federal Circuit reached a vastly different result. As in Kodak, a number of
independent service organizations brought suit against Xerox for refusing to
sell or license patented parts and copyrighted materials after having
previously done SO. 176  In response to the plaintiffs antitrust claims, the
defendant counterclaimed for patent and copyright infringement. 77  The
District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment for
Xerox, holding that a patent holder's right to refuse to deal does not violate
the antitrust laws, even if the refusal impacts a secondary or derivative
market, regardless of subjective intent or pretext. 178 The plaintiff appealed,.
and the Federal Circuit affirmed. 1
79
After concluding that the patent claims would be reviewed under Federal
Circuit law, the court began its analysis of the plaintiffs monopoly leveraging
claim.' 80 The court began by correctly pointing out that intellectual property
rights do not amount to a congressionally granted privilege to violate antitrust
laws.' 8' The court then stated the accepted view that the possession of a
patent does not, by itself, evidence the existence of monopoly power.' 82 From
there the court jumped to unilateral refusals to deal. 183
The court concluded that, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, a
patent holder's unilateral refusal to deal will never result in a violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act.' 84 In support of its conclusion that patent law
confers such broad rights, the court pointed to section 271(d) of the Patent
175. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
176. See id. at 1324.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. As is noted throughout this Comment, if this case were up on appeal today, the Federal
Circuit would not have jurisdiction because the patent claims at issue were not part of the plaintiff's
complaint, but part of a counterclaim. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,
535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002).
180. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1325. "In order to fufill our obligation of promoting
uniformity in the field of patent law, it is equally important to apply our construction of patent law to
the questions whether and to what extent patent law preempts or conflicts with other causes of
action." Id. (quoting Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
181. Id. (citing Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed Cir. 1999)).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1326.
184. Id. at 1326-28.
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Act185 and the Ninth Circuit's language in Kodak finding no case law
supporting a finding of liability for a patent holder's unilateral refusal to
deal. 18 6 The only circumstances found sufficient to confer liability in such a
situation would be when: (1) the plaintiff could show that the patent in
question was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation;18 7 or (2) a patent
infringement claim was a "sham" merely meant to frustrate competition.188
Finally, in upholding Xerox's monopoly leveraging via a unilateral refusal
to deal, the court expressly refused to follow either the guidance of the
Supreme Court in Image Technical Services or the Ninth Circuit in Kodak.
189
The court held that because a patent holder is well within its rights when it
refuses to sell or license a patented product, the court would not look into the
subjective reasoning underlying such a decision.19° Also, the court found that
because the Kodak case included tying claims when it came in front of the
Supreme Court, the language of Kodak footnote twenty-nine, stating that
patent holders can be liable when they extend a monopoly in one market to
the next, could be disregarded.' 9' The court concluded that in the absence of
proof showing sham litigation, tying, or fraud, "the patent holder may enforce
the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed
invention free from liability under the antitrust laws.... [T]herefore [the
court would] not inquire into his subjective motivation for exerting his
statutory rights .... ",1 92 Thus, the court refused to consider the wisdom of the
Ninth Circuit's presumption of validity, instead finding that patents ordinarily
are an absolute defense to an antitrust claim.
IV. DISCUSSION
As illustrated above, the Federal Circuit and Ninth Circuit have reached
185. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(d) (2002) (stating a patent owner shall not be "denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having ... refused to license
or use any rights to the patent").
186. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1326 (citing Image Tech. Servs. Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th Cir. 1997)).
187. Id. (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965)).
188. Id. (citing E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144
(1961)). "[A]n antitrust plaintiff must prove that the suit was both objectively baseless and
subjectively motivated by a desire to impose collateral, anti-competitive injury rather than to obtain a
justifiable legal remedy." Id. (quoting Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059,
1071 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted)).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1326-28.
192. Id. at 1327.
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diametrically opposed holdings in cases involving essentially identical fact
patterns and legal issues. This graphically illustrates the potential for conflict
between the patent laws and the Sherman Act. Although both bodies of law
serve important social goals, these goals must be harmonized. The Federal
Circuit's ISO decision does not contribute to these goals in any meaningful
way. The ISO decision serves only to extend the already expansive patent
holder rights beyond those intended by modem Congress while ignoring
competitive concerns. Indeed, if this case were heard today, the Federal
Circuit would not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. 193
However, despite the changes in Federal Circuit jurisdiction, there is still a
fundamental difference in scholarly and judicial opinion as to the extent to
which a refusal to deal is protected by the patent laws. 194 If this situation is
not addressed by either the Supreme Court or the Congress in the near future,
increased judicial confusion will undoubtedly result. In addition, patent
holders will be allowed to create and extend monopolies unimpeded, to the
detriment of small businesses. The result will be a loss of efficiency in
secondary markets and increased prices for consumers.
The remainder of this Comment considers the competing views
concerning the intersection of patent and antitrust law and suggests solutions
to the current split in the circuits. First, Part IV.A will consider the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation
Systems, 195 curtailing Federal Circuit jurisdiction. Part IV.A also will attempt
to gauge the impact that the Holmes Group decision is likely to have on patent
and antitrust law. Next, Part IV.B will analyze critically the Federal Circuit's
decision in ISO. In addition, Part IV.C will consider the impact that the
Kodak and ISO decisions have, and will have, on economic competition.
Finally, Part IV.D will suggest a number of solutions to the current split in the
circuits, such as affirmative action by Congress or a Supreme Court ruling
affirming the Kodak decision.
A. The Reigning in of the Federal Circuit
A discussion of the Federal Circuit's decision in ISO would be incomplete
without considering the procedural context in which the case was decided.
Beginning in the early 1990s, the Federal Circuit expanded its jurisdiction to
include not only "well pleaded" patent claims, but also compulsory and even
193. See infra Part IV.A.
194. See, e.g., C.J. Alice Chen, Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 141, 157 (2003) (describing conflict between patent and antitrust laws).
195. 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
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permissive counterclaims. 196 This laid the groundwork for the ISO litigation
and Federal Circuit influence over antitrust law.
Had the ISO litigation taken place today, the Federal Circuit would not
have had jurisdiction over the case. The reason for this is the Supreme
Court's 2002 decision in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Systems, Inc.197 The remainder of this section will dissect and explain the
wisdom of the Holmes Group decision. In addition, this section will attempt
to outline the impact that decision may have on the future of both patent and
antitrust litigation.
1. The Supreme Court's Decision in Holmes Group v. Vornado Air
Circulation Systems
As outlined above, in Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works,
Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd., the Federal Circuit unilaterally extended the reach of
its jurisdiction to include cases that included patent law counterclaims. 98
That decision opened the door for Federal Circuit adjudication of scores of
antitrust suits that otherwise would have been left to be decided by the various
regional circuits. Nonetheless, many viewed the decision as well reasoned
and correct. 199  Although popular reaction to the Aerojet decision was
generally positive, the holding in that case was undoubtedly in conflict with
previous Supreme Court precedent and the "well pleaded complaint" rule.
200
Although it took twelve years, this is what ultimately led to the overruling of
Aerojet by the Court in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys.,
Inc.
20 1
The factual underpinnings of the Holmes Group case illustrate the dangers
that the Aerojet decision presented, for example, forum shopping by parties
202wishing to have the Federal Circuit hear their case. In the original
litigation, the plaintiffs brought suit against the defendants for trade-dress
203infringement. The district court found in favor of Vornado on its trade
196. See supra Part II.C.
197. 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
198. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 740
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
199. See, e.g., U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811, 813 n.6 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing the
Federal Circuit's decision in Aerojet with approval); DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §
21.02[l][e], 21-91 n.129 (2002). Indeed, the Federal Circuit itself was so confident in the decision,
the court extended its holding to encompass permissive as well as compulsory counterclaims. See
DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
200. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988).
201. 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
202. See supra Part II.C.
203. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
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dress claim; however, on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's
decision, finding that the plaintiffs had no enforceable rights.
20 4
Not satisfied with the Tenth Circuit's decision, the plaintiffs decided to go
another route. They filed a complaint with the International Trade
Commission and issued a press statement,20 5 both claiming that Holmes
Group had infringed upon their trade dress.20 6 This prompted Holmes Group
to file suit in district court for declaratory judgment on the trade dress
infringement claim and an injunction against Vornado from distributing
statements claiming that Holmes Group infringed on its trade dress.2 0 7 As
expected, Vornado filed a patent infringement counterclaim in conjunction
with that case.20 8 Once again, the district court sided with Holmes Group,
granting both the declaratory judgment and the injunction.0 9 On cue,
Vornado filed an appeal with the Federal Circuit, which vacated the district
court judgment . 0
The Supreme Court "granted certiorari to consider whether the Federal
Circuit properly asserted jurisdiction over the appeal."2 1  In delivering the
opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia began by considering the language in 28
U.S.C. § 1338, the congressional grant of jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit. 212
Citing Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., he concluded that
Congress intended section 1338 to parallel 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which requires
that the plaintiffs "well pleaded" complaint "creates the cause of action.'2 1 3
Therefore, for jurisdiction to be proper under section 1338, federal patent law
must create the plaintiffs claim. 21 4 Because the Holmes Group complaint did
not assert any claims that "arose out of' or were "created by" federal patent
law, the Court found that the Federal Circuit had no jurisdiction over the
appeal.215
Having decided the primary question before the Court, Justice Scalia went
204. Id. at 1500-02.
205. See Chen, supra note 194, at 147.
206. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1141
(D. Kan. 2000).
207. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 828 (2002).
208. See id.
209. Id.
210. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 13 Fed. Appx. 961 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
The Federal Circuit vacated without a decision, but remanded for consideration of whether the
"change in law" exception to collateral estoppel applied in the instant case. Id. at 961.
211. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 829.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 829-30.
214. See id.
215. Id.
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on to clarify two additional points. First, he made it painfully clear that
neither permissive nor compulsory counterclaims have any bearing on
whether a case "arises under" the federal patent laws for purposes of section
1338 jurisdiction.1 6 Second, Justice Scalia reiterated his view that the
"arising under" requirement of section 1338 was identical to that found in
section 1331 and, therefore, required the patent law claim to be "on the face of
the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. 217
2. Impact of the Holmes Group Decision on Federal Circuit Influence
The effect of the Holmes Group decision is anything but certain. Indeed,
while the Supreme Court's mandate seemed concrete, the Federal Circuit has
rejected precedent before.2t 8 Although the Christianson decision seemed to
have little or no impact on Federal Circuit jurisprudence, the Holmes Group
decision has. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes Group, the
Federal Circuit has acknowledged the fact that Aerojet has been overruled and
has complied with the requirements outlined therein.21 9 What remains to be
seen, however, is the impact that this decision will have on both patent and
antitrust law and how it may relate to the questions presented in Kodak and
ISO.
A number of positive and overdue ramifications flow from the Supreme
Court's decision in Holmes Group. First, as Justice Scalia emphasized in the
opinion, plaintiffs will once again be the master of the complaint.220 Plaintiffs
will once again have the unfettered right to determine both the forum in which
their complaint is heard and the law that creates it. Said differently, plaintiffs
will no longer face the possibility that the forum they chose will be
unilaterally changed by the defendant interjecting a patent counterclaim.
Also, regional circuit autonomy over antitrust law will be re-solidified.221
216. Id. at 83 1. "[A] counterclaim-which appears as part of the defendant's answer, not as part
of the plaintiffs complaint-cannot serve as the basis for 'arising under' jurisdiction." Id
217. Id. at 834.
218. See supra Part II.C.
219. See, e.g., Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Stating:
Although Pingel's counterclaims requested direct coercive relief under the patent laws...
the Supreme Court held that § 1295(a)(1) authorizes us to exercise appellate jurisdiction
over only those appeals in which the complaint authorized the district court to exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338. After Vornado, we may no longer rely solely on
counterclaims arising under the patent laws to establish our appellate jurisdiction.
Id.
220. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 832.
221. See James W. Dabney, Holmes v. Vomado: A Restatement of the "Arising Under"
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, New York State Bar Ass'n Bright Ideas, Fall 2002, 2 at 6, available
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The Federal Circuit will no longer have the last word on the debate over the
intersection of antitrust and patent law. Instead, the regional circuits will now
have more of an opportunity to hear and apply their own precedent to
antitrust, copyright, trade dress, and other subjects.222  This will bring much
needed objectivity to decisions such as the Federal Circuit's ISO decision.
Finally, forum shopping by defendants wishing to have the Federal Circuit
hear an appeal is now impossible.223 Unless patent claims are part of a well
pleaded complaint, appellate jurisdiction over antitrust cases will be
determined by the court of first instance that the plaintiff chooses.
All of the effects mentioned above were originally intended by Congress
when it created the Federal Circuit; it simply took the Supreme Court twenty
years to clarify the law. However, many commentators have taken exception
to the Holmes Group decision and suggest a number of nefarious scenarios.
They point out that, in addition to transferring jurisdiction over patent
counterclaims and cross-claims to other federal circuit courts, the Holmes
Group decision allows state courts to hear certain patent cross and
counterclaims.22 4 They argue that such a situation is highly undesirable and
should be overruled by an act of Congress. 25 If Congress did intend to forego
such a possibility, the perversion of patent law by those courts would certainly
be grounds for an amendment to the jurisdictional scheme. However, this
development has yet to be seen.
22 6
Others argue that the Holmes Group decision will cause a "race to the
court house steps." It has been suggested that the Supreme Court's decision
will cause patent holders or infringers that fear prosecution to strike first by
filing suit for patent infringement.2 27 This type of forum shopping was no
doubt clear to the Court when it issued the opinion. However, the Court was
attempting to end a much more dangerous form of forum shopping-the type
of forum shopping witnessed in ISO and in Holmes Group itself.
Everything else being equal, one thing is clear: The Holmes Group
decision negatively impacts the precedential value of Kodak.22 8 If the case
at http://www.pennie.com/content/ItemContent/52FTarticle.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. See Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 831-32.
225. See, e.g., Molly Mosley-Goren, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering? Responding to Holmes
Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 26-29 (2002).
226. See id.
227. Elizabeth I. Rogers, The Phoenix Precedents: The Unexpected Rebirth of Regional Circuit
Jurisdiction Over Patent Appeals and the Need for a Considered Congressional Response, 16 HARV.
J. L. & TECH. 411,460-61 (2003).
228. See Chen, supra note 194, at 156.
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were heard today, any appeals would be forwarded to the Tenth Circuit
instead of the Federal Circuit. This does not solve the problem though,
because as the Federal Circuit pointed out in its opinion, the Tenth Circuit had
no precedent on point. 229 Therefore, it is unclear how that court, or any other
for that matter, would have ruled. In addition, instructive opinion on point in
other circuits is also lacking. Therefore, a court hearing a case with facts and
allegations similar to those in ISO and Kodak would nevertheless need to
choose either the rationale of the Ninth or Federal Circuit, in other words,
whether to adopt a rebuttable presumption that may be overcome by a
showing of pretext.
B. Neither Existing Patent nor Antitrust Law Supports the Federal Circuit's
Decision in ISO
It is settled law that a patent or copyright holder has no affirmative duty to
sell or license its products. Essentially, the patent holder is granted a
monopoly position in the primary market for those goods encompassed by the
patent. 230 However, the Supreme Court has established that when an
otherwise legal monopolist exploits that sanctioned position in order to
expand his monopoly into a secondary market, he has violated the Sherman
Act.231 Refusing to deal with a competitor in a derivative market, together
with sufficient evidence of a dominant position in that market, constitutes
prima facie evidence of an attempted monopolization in violation of section 2
of the Sherman Act.232 However, in such a case the adverse party will be able
233to escape liability by advancing a legitimate business justification.
According to the Kodak court, the possession of a patent, without additional
evidence, will be considered such a justification.234  However, that
presumption may be overcome by a showing of either fraud, misuse, or
229. See id.
230. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.. 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969) (patent
pooling case).
A patentee has the exclusive right to manufacture, use, and sell his invention .... The
heart of his legal monopoly is the right to invoke the State's power to prevent others from
utilizing his discovery without his consent . . . But there are established limits which the
patentee must not exceed in employing the leverage of his patent to control or limit the
operations of the license.
Id. at 135-36 (internal citations omitted).
231. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953).
232. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985).
233. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
234. See supra Part III.A.
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evidence that the exertion of patent rights was merely a pretext.235
The Federal Circuit impermissibly sidestepped the understood framework
for a section 2 violation by holding patent holders immune from such
scrutiny. A patent holder is immune under applicable case law and 35 U.S.C.
§ 27 1(d) only when it refuses to deal in the primary market for the patented
good.236 Complete protection from antitrust liability does not extend to the
secondary market, as the Kodak court properly held.237 As the Ninth Circuit
noted, "[the] basic right of exclusion does have limits .... Section 2 of the
Sherman Act condemns exclusionary conduct that extends natural monopolies
into separate markets. Much depends, therefore, on the definition of the patent
grant and the relevant market.
' 238
Without any meaningful analysis of the relevant markets, the Federal
Circuit simply assumed that a valid patent or copyright confers virtually
absolute protection to the holder, regardless of the markets affected.239
Although the court impliedly recognized the existence of two separate
markets, the court found that a patent grant could encompass multiple
markets.2 40  First, the court cited section 271(d) of the Patent Act for the
proposition that Xerox had not illegally extended its patent rights by refusing
to deal with the ISOs in the derivative market.241  However, as discussed
above, it is generally understood that the language of section 271(d) was
merely meant to codify existing case law dealing with the availability of the
tie-in patent misuse defense, not unilateral refusals to deal under section 2.242
Next, the court cited its own precedent for the proposition that a patent may
confer exclusionary rights in two separate antitrust markets.243 This would
have been persuasive if not for the fact that: (1) it is Federal Circuit precedent;
and (2) the cited passage concerned a jury instruction that again dealt with a
tying misuse claim.2"
The parts involved in the litigation were covered by patents as component
parts of copiers.245 Without the copiers, the parts are, in effect, useless. The
235. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219 (9th Cir. 1997); see
also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 484 (1992).
236. See supra Part IIB; see also Calkins, supra note 65, at 192-200.
237. See supra Part I1.
238. Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1216.
239. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
240. Id. at 1327.
241. Id. at 1326.
242. See supra Part III; see also Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1214 n.7; Calkins, supra note 65, at 197-
98.
243. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1327.
244. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
245. See supra Parts IlI.A & B.
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patent rights over such products, therefore, justifiably extend to the primary
market for those products, i.e., copiers.246 Thus, both the Federal Circuit and
the Ninth Circuit agree that it would be entirely legal and proper for Xerox or
Kodak to unilaterally refuse to sell copiers to the defendants or anyone else.
However, according to the Supreme Court's determination in Kodak v. Image
Technical Services, the aftermarket for parts and service is separate and
distinct from that for copiers.247 Even with primary and secondary markets
properly established, without more, a refusal to deal in the secondary market
would not implicate the antitrust laws.248 The courts have long recognized
that a refusal to deal in a competitive market is well within the rights of a
patent holder or any other producer, manufacturer, or service provider. 249 The
antitrust laws are only implicated when, as in ISO and Kodak, there is proof of
monopoly power in the derivative market. This is the point at which an
innocent refusal to deal becomes anticompetitive behavior within the meaning
of section 2.
The Ninth Circuit properly incorporated the realities of a secondary
service market in its analysis. As outlined above, the traditional elements of a
section 2 claim must be made out before business justifications will be
analyzed. The plaintiff must show that the defendant wields sufficient market
power in the secondary market and that the monopolist has engaged in
anticompetitive conduct before the court will even consider whether there
were any legitimate business justifications for that behavior.250 The plaintiff
has a heavy initial burden to carry, and still faces the prospect of losing if the
defendant can explain its behavior as promoting economic efficiency. Under
the Kodak rationale, the burden on a plaintiff will be exponentially higher
because of an inherent presumption of validity in cases involving patented or
copyrighted products. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit instituted a safeguard in
the form of an opportunity for the finder of fact to determine whether
protection of patents or copyrights was simply a pretext, or excuse, for
anticompetitive and exclusionary practices.
The Federal Circuit offered little in the way of affirmative support for its
refusal to consider the ISOs' assertions that Xerox's copyrights and patents
were merely pretext for its anticompetitive behavior.25  The court relied on
the First Circuit's decision in Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems
246. See supra Part II.B.
247. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 470-79 (1992).
248. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997).
249. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
250. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-14 (1984).
251. See Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1216.
[87:387
2003] INTERSECTION BETWEENANTITRUSTAND PATENTLAW 419
Support Corp.2 5 2 for the proposition that the presumption of legitimacy may
be overcome only by a showing of fraud in the Patent Office or use of a patent
infringement claim to impermissibly gain monopoly power.253 The Federal
Circuit's incorporation of Data General is not altogether misplaced.
However, if Data General is to be relied upon, that case must be viewed in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Image Technical Services. In that
case, the Court explicitly stated: "Kodak's willingness to allow self-service
casts doubt on its quality claim. In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that respondents 'have presented evidence from which a reasonable trier of
fact could conclude that Kodak's first reason is pretextual.', 254 The Federal
Circuit's opinion makes no mention of the above passage. Instead, the court
justified its position in favor of virtually blanket immunity by explaining that
allowing juries to look for pretext would be hazardous because it would allow
them to "second guess the subjective motivation of the copyright holder in
asserting" its right to refuse to deal. 55
The Federal Circuit's reasoning fails to consider that when judges and
juries make a determination of fact, they are often necessarily second guessing
the motivations of one party or another. The very reason for having a trier of
fact is to wade through the various arguments and, when provided with
sufficient information and guidance, to determine which party proved its case.
Therefore, there seems to be no hazard in allowing the trier of fact to do what
it is supposed to do. As the Supreme Court has indicated, when a patent right
is used merely as a pretextual justification of classic anti-competitive
behavior, the law should not shield the manufacturer from liability when, but
for the patents or copyrights, a Sherman Act violation would be found.
C. The Federal Circuit's Decision Works to Frustrate the Enforcement of
Antitrust Law and Unjustly Enriches Patent Holders at the Expense of
Consumers and Small Business
The ISOs involved in the litigation against Kodak and Xerox were
overwhelmingly small businesses. 256  For years, they had serviced those
manufacturers' copiers and had maintained a competitive atmosphere in the
market.2 57 In fact, there was evidence to suggest that consumers in the service
252. 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
253. In re Indep. Servs. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1329.
254. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 484 (1992) (emphasis
added).
255. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1329.
256. Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1201.
257. Id.
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and part market preferred the ISOs to the manufacturer.25 8 The reality of the
situation insists that Kodak's refusal to deal in the secondary market was not
motivated entirely by a desire to protect its patents. Had Kodak and Xerox
been exclusively concerned with protecting their intellectual property, they
would not have undertaken a pattern of past sales and licensing of patented
parts and manuals to the ISOs in the first instance. 259 In the same respect, if
their goal was increased profits, that could have been achieved legally through
increasing prices for component parts sold directly to the ISOs or by
increasing licensing fees charged to the independent original equipment
manufacturers, which would then have been passed on to the ISOs. The only
reasonable explanation was that, as the jury in the Kodak district court case
found, these explanations were merely pretext. 260 It is self evident that
Kodak's and Xerox's intention was to drive the ISOs out of business by
depriving them of a source for replacement parts, without which they could
not hope to compete in the service market. There was no indication in either
of the relevant cases that the ISOs had infringed on the patents involved.
Rather, they simply sought to compete on a level playing field in the service
market. By denying them this right, the Federal Circuit has ensured a
monopoly for the patent holders and has also erected insurmountable entry
barriers while condoning anticompetitive behavior.
It stands to reason that the Federal Circuit's holding in ISO will extend to
any other market for patented goods, such as those for computers, televisions,
and other consumer goods. In such markets, producers may now strangle the
service market without fear of antitrust liability. This means that prices for
end users may very well go up while the service provided could deteriorate.
Without the specter of competitors or possible entry, the producers will be
able to charge whatever the market will bear for service and will have little
incentive to improve the quality of the service products offered.
The Ninth Circuit's decision carries with it no such deleterious
consequences. Patent holders would not be stripped of their inherent rights to
exclude in the primary market for their goods. In most cases, those patent
holders will not be required to deal with potential customers, even in the
secondary market. They will potentially be liable only when they step outside
the confines of the competitive framework. As in the Kodak case, patent
holders will face liability when they cannot justify their actions-when the
258. Id. "ISOs began servicing Kodak equipment in the early 1980's, and have provided
cheaper and better service at times, according to some customers. ISOs obtain parts for repair service
from a variety of sources, including, at one time, Kodak." Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1201-02.
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only reason for the refusal to deal is to foreclose competition completely.
This determination will be a question of fact, properly left to the trier of fact,
in most cases a jury. Thus, in only the most blatant cases will patent holders
be subjected to liability. This framework neither frustrates the goals of patent
law, nor does it discourage innovation. Patent holders will still be able to
protect their inventions; however, they will need to be mindful of stepping
outside the law. Encouraging such competitive responsibility is what the
Ninth Circuit had in mind in the Kodak decision, and this, in turn, adds to the
harmonization of the patent and antitrust laws.
D. Possible Solutions
The dissonance between the circuits on this important subject will
undoubtedly lead to uncertainty about the rights of patent holders and those
who compete with them and may spur additional litigation. Therefore, a
solution must be devised to settle once and for all the question of whether a
unilateral refusal to deal by a patent holder in the secondary market for a good
is a violation of the law. A definitive solution to this quandary could take two
forms: (1) a change to the Patent Act expressly denying antitrust immunity for
patent holders who leverage or attempt to foreclose competition in secondary
or derivative markets for patented goods; or (2) a Supreme Court decision
affirming Kodak.
The simplest and most definitive solution to the split between the circuits
would be congressional amendment of the Patent Act. Section 271 of the Act
currently states that a "patent owner otherwise entitled to relief.., shall [not]
be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent
right by reason of his having... (4) refused to license or use any rights to the
patent .... ,,26 The Federal Circuit cited this section as support for its
contention that monopoly leveraging falls under the antitrust immunity
afforded to patent holders.262 The Ninth Circuit disagreed and found that this
section did not apply to monopoly leveraging claims.263
This language has led to extensive confusion over the section's
application to the fact patterns in Kodak and ISO. Simply adding the words
"in the primary market for the patent good" to section 271(d)(4) should end
confusion regarding congressional intent. A number of commentators have
advanced the idea that this addition would merely embody the original
261. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2002).
262. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
263. See Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1214 n.7 (stating that although the section protects the core right
of a patent holder to exclude others, it does not preclude other antitrust claims such as monopoly
leveraging).
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congressional intent;264 however, expressly stating it in the section will bar a
sympathetic court from interpreting the statute otherwise.
Also, the Supreme Court could grant certiorari in a monopoly leveraging
case and affirm the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kodak. It is likely that if the
Court did review a decision similar to that in Kodak, the Court would agree
with the reasoning therein. The Court has a solid tradition of properly
balancing the rights of monopolists with patent holders in regard to leveraging
of power in one market to exploit the next. The presumption embodied in the
Kodak decision properly balanced all relevant considerations. The Kodak
court considered the patent holder's rights and the needs of a competitive
market place and correctly determined that a rebuttable presumption struck an
appropriate balance between the two bodies of law. It is therefore unlikely
that the Supreme Court would turn its back on such reasoning and instead
come down in favor of the Federal Circuit's short-sighted reasoning in ISO.
V. CONCLUSION
The tensions that exist between antitrust and patent law are bound to
continue. However, in order to preserve healthy competition and economic
growth, it must be understood that although the patent laws protect inventions,
that protection is limited. Patent holders need to know that when they step
outside their legislative grant, they will face the potential of antitrust liability.
As this Comment has attempted to illustrate, the relevant case law and
economic factors necessitate holding patent holders liable for their
anticompetitive behavior. When a patent holder uses a sanctioned monopoly
position in one market to eliminate competition in another, that patent holder
should be on notice that those actions may carry liability with them.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kodak properly balanced the rights of
patent holders with those of competitors under the antitrust laws. Even
assuming the pretext analysis advanced by that court, potential plaintiffs will
still face an uphill battle, and presumably only the most blatant abuses will
result in liability. The Federal Circuit's opinion goes too far to protect patent
holders by extending immunity from antitrust laws beyond what Congress
intended. There is little reason to extend patent protection beyond its current
bounds because too much protection will ultimately frustrate the public policy
underlying that protection: the benefit to consumers. In addition, the circuit
courts need to be aware that the laws of this nation were intended to extend
beyond the protection of patent holders and instead make the consumer the
touchstone of a patent law and antitrust analysis. Therefore, Congress or the
264. See generally Calkins, supra note 65, at 204-16.
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Supreme Court should make it clear that patent holders will be required to
compete on a level playing field outside the primary market for their patented
and copyrighted intellectual properties.
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